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February 24, 2004

Institutional Challenges of US Military Weapon Innovation: The Case of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Military weapon acquisition in the US is remarkably complex given the number of multiple stakeholders, a situation that creates sharp inter-organizational tensions. For instance, there are tensions between Congress and the Executive Branch, the military officers in the field and those at headquarters, and tensions between officers who set requirements of weapon systems and those who do program design and construction.

Jon Rosenwasser, a current PhD candidate at the Fletcher School, is exploring the implications of these tensions for weapon innovation. His research leverages his professional experience as the chief Democratic staff member for National Defense and International Affairs on the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, where he observed first-hand the difficulties in breeding military innovation.

He says, “I am focusing on one kind of innovation in weapon systems and examining one program, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). My study looks at the period since 1986 to evaluate how two key reforms enacted at that time, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and recommendations from the Packard Commission, affected inter-organizational relations in weapon acquisition in general and innovations like UAVs in particular”.

UAVs are remotely piloted aircraft, used predominantly for intelligence-gathering missions, but in recent years have served as platforms to launch missiles. The military has been experimenting with them since the 1920s, with a more intensive effort since 1987. Rosenwasser observes, “Top officials have consistently identified them as an important weapon system, yet the military still only has relatively few. Why?” He thinks the answer lies with the 1986 reforms.

Goldwater-Nichols and the Packard Commission were a reaction to several military operational mishaps, such as the disastrous hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980 and the Grenada invasion in 1983, and accompanying embarrassing overruns in acquisition costs.

As a remedy, Goldwater-Nichols legislated sweeping changes to address the lack of cooperation among the Services in combat; enhanced operational compatibilities among the US military services; improved professional military education; and unified the national military command structure. But it also fundamentally altered relationships between the US military and the civilian sides of the defense establishment. The Packard Commission examined the defense management practices focusing on the acquisition process. The reforms consequently streamlined the acquisition process through changes in culture and adoption of competitive corporate models; changed the organizational culture; and improved planning.

Some critics argue that the 1986 reforms strengthened uniformed military authorities without bestowing civilians with complementary authorities, thereby upsetting the balance in civil-military relations. Rosenwasser raises a related concern, “The 1986 reforms centralized decision-making authority and promoted joint-ness among the military Services. Has this helped or hampered innovation? This is an especially important question as the U.S. adapts to wage the ‘global war on terrorism”.

His most significant conclusion is that the 1986 reforms have had mixed blessings. Goldwater-Nichols and the Packard recommendations may have improved combat effectiveness, but they have also exposed the challenges of acquiring innovative weapons for multiple military Services. Rosenwasser states, “The case of UAVs is a window onto the political hazards that the 1986 reforms created for innovation. Centralized authorities dispense necessary rules and guidelines to ensure that military programs are interoperable, but the complexity of modern warfare demands that responsibility for procuring innovative systems must be more decentralized.”

Rosenwasser enrolled in the doctoral studies in the fall of 2000. “I was drawn to Fletcher because of its curriculum, which is application and policy-oriented, as well as the expertise of the faculty within the field of international security,” he says. Having completed his classes in the fields of Political Systems and Theory, International Security and his specially–designed field, Strategic Management and Organization, he now directs his undivided attention towards his doctoral research.

But his research has not been without challenges. “I have interviewed over 90 officials, but some are not always forthcoming. And those currently in office are sometimes less than open because they are protecting current institutional positions,” he says. This is especially true among active uniformed military officers. Additionally, aspects of his research have been complicated by classification of relevant information, such as how UAVs have been used in the war against terrorism.

“At times, I have been daunted by the political complexities, the technical details and the scope of my project,” Rosenwasser says. “Understanding how the four Armed Services each procure weapon systems within the overarching Pentagon system is not an easy task, and I’ve had to learn multiple ‘languages’ in the process-that of each armed service, of weapon acquisition, and of UAVs”, he adds.

Nonetheless, Rosenwasser feels he has largely succeeded. The military and other Pentagon officials, in his opinion, appreciate the importance of his research and try to provide as much information as they can to give him a comprehensive view of the issues he is examining.

Jon is a fellow at the Brookings institution. Prior to Fletcher, he served as an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City and Washington, DC, and researched on how the politics of the budget process affect the ability of the U.S. military to innovate. Jon graduated with a B.A. (with honors) from Stanford University, and earned a Master of Public Policy from Duke University.

Posted by jessica at February 24, 2004 10:27 AM