Iran’s tentative acceptance of an agreement to sell the majority of its nuclear fuel to Russia is a major step forward in reducing the threat that a nuclear Iran poses to the international community. The agreement, which is still awaiting approval by both the Obama administration and the Ahmadinejad government, would require Iran to ship nearly three-quarters of its nuclear fuel to Russia to be processed into a form that can only be used in “peaceful” nuclear reactors. As it stands, the plan would lay the groundwork for the re-opening of diplomatic relations between the US and Iran and would begin to resolve security issues in the Middle East. Yet the proposed deal cannot be seen as a panacea. The long-term commitment of US allies to a non-nuclear Iran, the Iranian leadership’s poor record of transparency, and the impact of negotiations on Iran’s domestic opposition movement remain critical areas of concern for the Obama administration.

Most importantly, it is not clear that other powers share the US commitment to disabling Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities. If the current deal is approved, Iran’s capacity to produce nuclear weapons will be reduced, at least in the short-term. In time, however, Iran could restock its supply of enriched uranium. Despite this risk, Iran’s acceptance of the current deal may lull allies into a false sense of security. European allies may back down from continuing to pressure Iran to end its nuclear program. The response from Russia and China – nations who have extensive trade relations with Iran – is likely to be even less supportive of continued pressure on Iran to abolish its nuclear program. While the current agreement shows important progress in the movement toward a non-nuclear Iran, the US cannot afford to let negotiations pacify European allies and prevent further progress on this issue.

In addition to the potential response of US allies, Iran’s history of deception and evasiveness in regards to its nuclear programs casts a shadow over the current deal. Iran has long concealed its nuclear aims and activities. The Natanz facility was disclosed in 2002 not by the Iranian government but by an opposition group. A 2005 IAEA report maintained that Iran had been undertaking steps to develop its nuclear program for years. In the context of the current deal, Iran has promised to allow IAEA inspectors into the Qom facility, yet there are still questions as to whether the facility even houses fissile material. Given that Iran’s track record of transparency is poor, the US cannot assume that Iran will be forthcoming in future talks or will be fully committed to the deal now on the table.

Finally, opening diplomatic relations with Iran threatens to undermine the Iranian opposition movement. Since this summer’s Green Revolution, a significant portion of the country’s youth and urban middle-class, along with a handful of key political figures, has come to view the ruling regime as corrupt and repressive. This movement has undermined popular support for Ahmadinejad and demonstrated that significant fissures have developed within Iranian leadership. Yet negotiating with Iran bestows upon the Ahmadinejad government legitimacy that the regime does not deserve and gives the government the political capital it needs to continue suppressing dissenters. Negotiating with Iran may therefore bolster the Ahmadinejad regime and reduce the opposition’s ability to mount effective resistance.

Reaching agreement will not eliminate the threat of a nuclear Iran but will likely have a dramatic impact on US-Iran relations and work to relieve Middle East tensions. However, given the costs involved with negotiating – weakening of ally resolve, continued deceptiveness on the part of Iran, and undermining of domestic opposition – the Obama administration must continue to proceed with caution in its dealing with Iran.

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There was an article recently in the New York Times about a Russian antiquarian who specialized in expensive (some worth hundreds of thousands of dollars) gifts which wealthy businessmen buy to grease the palms of politicians. The whole article can be found here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/europe/21voltaire.html?scp=4&sq=russia&st=cse and it is definitely worth the read. Much has been written on corruption in Russia, indeed in the popular imagination Russia has often become a symbol of corrupt governement or business practices, but this article puts an interesting spin on the issue. One of the most astounding things though is the quote from Mr. Bobovnikov at the very end of the article where he says that, actually, this corruption may not be such a bad thing.

While serving as a Peace Corps Volunteer one of the things that astounded me most was the level of corruption in my host country. When teachers received their salaries the first questions they always asked each other were “how much did you sign for? How much did you get?” Not only was the director taking a slice out of their official salaries (the amount they signed for), but that amount wasn’t even constant. I later learned that teachers who refused to join the ruling party had a larger cut taken out of their checks than those who did. Students bought their grades, teachers bought their jobs, ministry officials bought their appointments and so it went. From my perspective, corruption was a pernicious phenomenon that stood in the way of progress. After all, how can you generate an educated workforce if the only way to get into, or through, university was to buy your grades, no matter whether you were a good student or not? How can a state provide services if tax officials can be persuaded not to collect taxes for a kickback?

Imagine my surprise then when, in my class on Corruption, Conflict and Peacebuilding, we discussed the possible benefits of corruption in a post-conflict or otherwise fragile society. One of the key arguments is that corruption creates an atmosphere wherein those in power have an interest in preserving the status quo, rather than allowing a country to spiral down into violence. I am not sure to what extent I believe that this theory applies in all contexts: The country I am researching at the moment, Georgia, arguably reached its highest level of corruption just before the Rose Revolution, at what time it was arguably approaching failed state status. The Rose Revolution was actually sparked by widespread irregularities in the 2003 parliamentary elections, and has often been described as an “anti-corruption revolution.”

Still, it is interesting to examine all the effects—including some positive ones— that something we usually think of as purely detrimental can have on a system. I guess I’ll have to add “could be good for the National Museum” to my list of effects corruption could have.

Any corruption here?

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Students representing over 70 countries join with an experienced faculty to inform classroom discussions with diverse viewpoints. Immersed in this dynamic environment, broadly knowledgeable and inquisitive leaders develop a thorough and nuanced grounding in the latest political, economic, business, and legal thinking and translate it into practical successful actions that shape international issues and events. (From the homepage of the Fletcher website.)

One of the strengths of Fletcher is that the education is practical…or at least, this is how it is promoted. But what does that really mean?

This semester I am taking the advanced Evaluation module, where Professor Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church is giving eight of us the opportunity to actually run a live evaluation for the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Professor Church is an independent evaluator, who teaches part time while still conducting evaluations for ICTJ and Search for Common Ground, along with other organizations in the peacebuilding field. This means that her classes are extremely practical, and that she can provide an up-to-date understanding of current trends in the field of evaluation. My first semester, I took her course on Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Programs, which provided me with concrete skills that actually used in my internship at Twaweza over the summer. With one course, I was able to help Twaweza hire an independent evaluator, since I could assess proposals accurately and know which questions needed to be asked of potential consultants. I also advised on the design of their monitoring and evaluation framework, and helped the Learning and Communications director think through how to make Twaweza truly a learning organization.

The work this semester for the ICTJ, truthfully, is taking up a lot more of my time then a half semester course probably should. Yet, I am learning how to develop surveys, conduct interviews, work with clients, and analyze data collected in many forms, skills that will come in useful in any career. Through this course, and in many other ways, Fletcher provides a practical education that is preparing all of us to, in Fletcher’s words, “become innovative leaders and problem-solvers in business, government, and non-governmental organizations worldwide.”

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Widely used by Kissinger, Back Channel Negotiations (BCN) are a type of negotiation where there is no media involved and sometimes people don’t even know they are taking place. There is an expectation that they will eventually become public and successful, and they are distinct from “classified” negotiations which are supposed to remain classified.

They can be conducted in one of two ways: (i) through intermediaries or (ii) directly.

Most of the reasons leaders pursue BCN have to do with “audience costs”, which are the loss of political power that flows from a political audience witnessing a leader shift from a traditional bargaining position. To that end, public negotiation is similarly to performing on a public stage. There are different kinds of audiences: international, national, elites… and it is important to remember that even authoritarian governments have audience costs, they are present in every type of negotiation.

In brief, audience costs make bargaining difficult, costly and inefficient and have the following problems:

Audience costs impose a “deadweight” loss to the table. Without these costs, there is a wider range of bargaining solutions that could be achieved. In addition to that, no one wants to get fame for a political failure, and public known failures are avoided by BCN.

However, there is a flip side to all of this. We can think of it in terms of audience “effects” instead of costs, since a good negotiator can also generate “audience benefits”.

BCN are generally used in situations where failure has a higher tendency of being the outcome because audience costs are usually higher when there is a national threat / war/ upheavals at stake: (i) in this case, negotiators are all adversaries and (ii) spoilers (actors that have an incentive for political negotiations to fail) are likely present within the governments of both sides.

Some examples of BCN include US/Algeria/Iran, US/UK/Libya; India/Pakistan/Kashmir, Vietnam among others. Up to date there is a mixed record of successes and failures, mainly because the players are adversaries so the odds are stacked against a successful BCN. Therefore, starting-up a BCN is already difficult due to layers of miscommunication and mistrust. Eventually, if you engage in BCN, you might run into an implementation dilemma, which are the costs of implementing the decisions. In a lot of ways, BCN are like narcotics, if feels good when you do them, you want to keep using them but in the process you debilitate your entire brain. Use it moderately and don’t play too much with bureaucratic politics.

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On Saturday, I had the opportunity to attend OMC 2009, a conference organized by the Open Mobile Consortium and MobileActive.  The conference was in the unique format of a bar camp, in that there were no panelists, nor was there a set agenda.  Rather, it is whoever shows up that makes the agenda, which changes continually throughout the day.  The idea is that everyone has something to contribute and everyone needs to be involved in the event – there are no tourists at a bar camp.

The event was at UNICEF in NYC and brought together developers, practitioners, and students to discuss the possibilities and challenges of using mobile phones for social change.  I had the opportunity to share my experience from my internship this summer, where I help to design a methodology for gathering survey data through mobile phones.  The advantage is that survey data can then be gathered weekly or monthly, rather than every 6 years, allowing for more informed decision-making by the government and NGOs.  This survey is in the process of being implemented in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

I learned a great deal about other projects, including FrontlineSMS Medic, Call Pigeon, and the Ujima Project, which are all worth checking out.  The goal of all of these projects is the basis of my thesis research – improving societies by increasing information, thereby empowering people to change their own lives, and making development work more informed and efficient.

The format of the conference meant that everyone had a chance to talk about their individual projects, and there was significant informed debate about how to encourage best practices in this very new field.  A few themes emerged, such as the need for thorough context analysis in order to really understand a community before you implement any new technology.  As with all development programs, there is also a need for better monitoring and evaluation to understand which tools are actually impacting the intended social change, along with the need for increase communication within the field in order that different organizations can learn from each other, rather than competing.  This is one of the central goals of the OMC, and events such as the one on Saturday are doing a great deal to contribute to this learning.

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Managing Political Risk; a Cross Sectoral Conference on Political Risk Measurement and Mitigation, organized by a group of talented and dedicated Fletcher students. A unique opportunity aimed at convening renowned professionals in four main areas: Energy & Resource Nationalism; Political Risk & Business Intelligence, Investment & Trade Finance in Conflict-Affected Countries; and Investment Guarantees & Political Risk Insurance.

Brightly lit by the colored leaves in the New England trees, the day starts early. Professionals, faculty and students are welcomed with a hot coffee and a warm smile. Neatly decorated tables anxiously await the panelists that will engage in lively discussions throughout the day. Around the room, the organizers of the conference make sure every detail is taken care of. In the first row, note takers stretch their fingers. In the back, ushers guide the guests and panelists to their designated seats. In the midst of tension, lots of smiles fill the room.

Dr. Louis T. Wells, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management from the Harvard Business School cheerfully kicks the meeting off with the difficult task of defining Political Risk, or not, and exemplifying ways in which it can be created or avoided. In brief, Political Risk is basically “things government does that lower investors’ rate of return”. He sets the stage in an elegant way, and makes sure his players are ready for the show.

Taking advantage of the development in communication networks, the conference main points and discussions will be broadcast live through its blog and on Twitter (@politicalrisk with the hashtag #MPR2009), a medium that can be used for posing questions in case you are following it from afar. If you at the Conference, be sure to join the LinkedIn Group and keep in touch with professionals and students interested in this field.

A long day lies ahead and we are all looking forward to every minute of it. Come and join us.

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Jakub Grygiel in this American Interest article argues that failed states, like Afghanistan, are power “vacuums” that could lead to Great Power confrontation.

According to Grygiel:

The interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state or to engage in “nation-building” for humanitarian purposes but to establish a foothold in the region, to obtain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector, and to weaken the presence of other great powers.

Grygiel uses the term “nation-building” but that is primarily a lexicon used by the U.S. to describe its robust  involvement with governments in troubled or post-conflict regions.  The principle U.S. government apparatus overseeing these operations is the Department of States’ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).  This Office’s operations are augmented with support from the  DoD, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, amongst others.  Altogether these agencies work to “help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”

This is the U.S. approach to “nation-building” but Grygiel argues that these operations are part of a larger strategy to claim neo-colonial possessions before other equal or growing powers do so.  Thus, if we were to combine this theory with practice, we could look at where the S/CRS nation-builds and see if there is competition from other foreign powers for regional clout.  Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan provide three cases of S/CRS assistance. With the most obvious example of Great Power “competition” over clout within these states coming from China.  To be sure, there are plenty other states where competition to fill power vacuums could occur but these three examples are a good test of Gyrgiel’s theory.

To keep this post short, we’ll take at face value that U.S. assistance in these states is, at least in part, conditional; meaning aid-receiving governments must comply with a certain level of American influence on their political system. Now in comparison, China’s support (foreign direct investment) is mostly unconditional.

Contrary to the U.S., China’s primary reason to become involved with these states is economic instead of security-oriented.  Seemingly, this is why China cares less about the character of the political system and more about absolute resources gains.  In essence, China pursues a moral-free foreign policy agenda while the U.S. sees its interests as more comprehensive entailing free markets, stabilization, and regional security.

Returning to the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan examples, we can see how China’s involvement is competitive with the U.S. less in a security sense, and more in an economic sense. This is not to say that competition over resources will never breed conflict, but that resource competition is more likely to occur between countries such as Russia and China or India and China, than it is to occur between the U.S. and other great or growing powers.

Here’s a list of three instances when China has “nation-built” in tandem with the U.S. (note, in only Sudan could Chinese actions be seen as contrary to U.S. interests):

• Iraq: China’s National Petroleum Corporation won the first petrol licensing bid worth $3 billion.
• Afghanistan: The China Metallurgical Group win’s the largest bid in Afghanistan history (worth $3.5 billion) to develop the Aynak copper field.
• Sudan: Despite the ICC arrest warrant for Omar Bashir, China still engages in an arms trade with Sudan and develops its oil fields.

These Chinese investments are clearly intended to resource China’s growth needs.  And despite the exuberant investments, there has been no competition between China and the U.S. that could be called destabilizing to international security.  Of course, who knows what the future holds and if competition would arise eventually.  But it’s a leap to say power vacuums will automatically lead to competition between all Great Powers.

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The Art and Science of Statecraft is a class taught by Prof. Daniel Drezner, who also keeps his own blog. In today’s class we discussed Ross’ 10 rules of negotiation. Apparently common sense, there are some important tips useful to remember:

1. Define y our preferences: know what you want and know how to respond to what the other side does. Have a clear hierarchy of interests as to what is important and what is less so. At the same time, the leading negotiator needs to think of response strategies to everything the other party might say. Simply put, this is called “doing your homework” and it is referred to as “talking points”.
2. Learn about the other side: as much as possible. “Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer”. Try to answer the following questions: what do the other parts want? What are their political constraints? This requires that you engage in active listening to fully understand why they are negotiating. Some negotiating styles include boring the listener as much as they can. Stay alert and pay attention.
3. Develop trust with the counterparts: and the negotiating parts; speak the same language. Honor your words, don’t be late, and protect private confidences. Most importantly, display empathy.
4. Develop explanations from common understandings: once you understand how the other side thinks, you can potentially articulate a reason that they could give to their own country to justify their actions. Be smart.
5. Know your reservation price: after what point will you not bend or yield? Empathy is useful and productive, but the other side must know your limit because you are not in power and your country is not willing to make concessions. Know how far you can go.
6. Beware good cop/bad cop: this happens when one person tries to scare you and then walks out of the room. Then, the other person pretends to be nice, offers you a drink and you become friends. Remember, they are on the same side.
7. Use deadlines wisely: the advantage of deadlines, the point at which parts need to end negotiations, is that it forces the parts to come to an agreement. However, that might not always happen and sometimes it is necessary to have flexibility. Remember that the conditions change if you need to meet again in the future and negotiate the same issue.
8. Don’t bluff: negotiation is like poker. It might even work, but if you are caught in a bluff or a lie, you lose your credibility. Don’t do it. And if you see anyone doing it, walk out of the room.
9. Don’t paper over differences: being nice just for the sake of being nice is a diplomatic instinct. But the last thing you want is diplomatic nicety and each side believing that they are in agreement, but in fact, they are not. Be direct.
10. Agree on what’s agreed: summarize your agreements, don’t use vague language, make sure everyone is on the same page, put everything in writing and make sure the language is clear.

Common sense or not, it is always important to keep them in mind.

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Shining shoes hurt the student’s eyes as they walk into the 7^th floor of the Fletcher School to salute their fellow students in uniform. In between a bite of turkey wrap and a sip of beer, students in the Navy, in the Army and in the Military describe their most important and challenging missions and recount fascinating stories. My attention was caught by the differences in the uniforms, which vary a little between countries, but have the same basic characteristics:

Navy: coloring their black suites are different “badges” that can be divided into two main categories: breast insignia (usually worn immediately above and below ribbons) and identification badges (usually worn at breast pocket level). The former insignia are divided between command and warfare and other qualification. In the US, they are issued by the Department of the Navy to naval service members who achieve qualifications and accomplishments while serving on both active and reserve duty in the US Navy. Internationally, the symbols on the wrists represent the country they are from and the stripes, their level in the Navy hierarchy.

Army: the Army has made fundamental changes in its uniform since the beginning of the 21st century. Five years ago, they decided to replace the battle dress and desert camouflage uniforms with the digitized Army Combat Uniform. There are separate styles for ground forces and support troops, aviators and tank crew members.

Military: the soldiers present in the room wear a wide assortment of insignia, ribbons, tabs, medals, badges, and patches on their green suits. To the civilians who listen to them, the variety is bewildering. The military patiently describe how each device represents a Soldier’s accomplishment and is a great source of pride and accomplishment.

As a child, I remember wanting to be in the Navy, probably a consequence of the recruiting ads in the California TV commercials. The challenge, according to a woman in the Navy who wears an impeccable dark suit and talks avidly to the students, is keeping the hair always nice.

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I have recently come across an interview with an expert in project finance of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Renato Mazzola, 33, is in the final phase of a complex financial transaction that began 2 years ago, and its goal is to grant a loan of US$ 2.5 billion to a highway project in Brazil. In structuring his project, he has been dealing with the governments of Japan and France, French and Portuguese banks, a Portuguese partner in Brazil and the IDB.

In order to discuss project finance it is necessary to have a comprehensive education and training, sometimes hard to find in Brazil. Financing a port or a subway system are things that cannot be done based on company’s balance sheets. There must be a specific funding for the project and there are few institutions that can do that. In addition to that, the ability to negotiate with people from various cultures at the same time is something he sees as missing in Brazil, even in high caliber professionals, where there is a lack of knowledge of other cultures and different languages.

With a BA in economics from PUC and an MBA in Capital Markets from USP (Sao Paulo), seven years ago Renato Mazzola was a proud student of International Relations at the Fletcher School, “the most traditional IR school in the US”. He mentions having had many Chinese friends sent by their government to study abroad. In return, they bring innovation and new ideas to their country. The Brazilian government however has little incentive and there are few institutions that offer scholarships to graduate students.

Because of the classes he had with Domingo Cavallo (former Argentine finance minister) who has one of his advisors, Renato decided to study democratization in Latin America. It was during the first referendum of the Hugo Chávez government. He then decided to spend six months living in Caracas, before finishing his degree. According to him, the best way to attract capital to Brazil, and to have a “real globalization”, is by living in other cultures, learning how to do business in another country while at the same time promoting your own.

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